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The Use in Montana of the Trust as a
Substitute for a Will
CHARLES W. LEAPHART*
Prior to 1536 in England the use was a favorite means for
devising land in evasion of the law forbidding its devise. The
passage of the Statute of Uses in 15361 curtailed the scheme.'
The hostility thereby engendered resulted in the passage in 1540
of the Statute of Wills' restoring the power to devise lands."
While that statute and other succeeding legislation render the
use and its modern successor, the trust, no longer indispensible
to the owner of property who wishes to will his real property
yet the trust is a device which is now and has for some time
been very much in use as a substitute for a will both for devis-
ing land and bequeathing personal property.
As a substitute for a will it has been perhaps most frequent-
ly used to escape inheritance and succession taxes. While the
avenues of successful evasion of those burdens may have been
almost if not quite completely closed, there still remain ad-
vantages to be gained by its use, chief of which is avoiding the
expense and delay which is attendant upon probate proceedings.
If the trust is successfully created the beneficiary who is to
come into possession of the property upon the death of the cre-
ator of the trust may begin that enjoyment immediately there-
after. The expenses are largely in the control of the settlor,'
and may be especially small when the trustor is also trustee.
In most jurisdictions the trust can be made an almost if
not a perfect substitute for a will.' The trustor may enjoy the
property during his life substantially as though he had the en-
tire ownership, and where "tentative trusts" are held valid,
may even retain complete control of the species of property to
which the doctrine applies.' In Montana the extent to which it
can be used is not clearly indicated by statute or decision. It is
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, Montana State University.
127 HENRY VIII, c. 10 (1536).
'4 HowDawoT, HISToaY op ENGLISH LAw (3rd ed. 1924) p. 464.
'32 HENRY VIII, c. 1 (1540).
'HoLDsworTH, op. cit. euprt note 2, p. 465.
'For figures see STzPnHNSoN, LiviNo Taus (1926) p. 273 et. seq.
'See Leaphart, The Trust as G Substitute for a Wil, 78 U. Op PA. L.
lEN. 626 (1930). Acknowledgement is due to the UNivasarry or PENN-
SYLVANIA LAW RuvIuw for its kind permission to use material from
that article.
'See the tentative trust cases discussed infra pp. 33, 34.
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the purpose of this article to discuss the use of this device in
Montana.
The creation of a trust is simple as far as formalities go.
If the settlor, or creator of the trust, or as defined in our codes,
the trustor,' desires to make himself trustee of his personal prop-
erty, he may in Montana,' as elsewhere, use any form of words
to make his intent known. In the case of real property in Mon-
tana he must comply with the Montana Statute of Frauds."
If the settlor desires to have another than himself as trustee
he must take proper steps to transfer the property. If it is a
trust of personal property presumably in Montana, as in the
case of a gift not on trust," there must be delivery of the prop-
erty if capable of delivery, or delivery of a deed or written
grant ;" if of real property, there must be a delivery of a deed to
the property." In other jurisdictions the cases are numerous in
which intended gifts in trust have failed because the transfer of
title was incomplete."' While one might expect that all the
requisites would be necessary that are demanded when an out-
right gift is made, yet the doctrine that equity will not let a
trust fail for want of a trustee has been held applicable in cases
of deeds of land upon trust where the trustee was either not
named in the deed or was not a legal entity.' The Montana Su-
preme Court has not passed upon this question. It is perhaps
doubtful enough so that ordinary caution would require the
naming of a trustee in the deed. Although Sections 7884 and
7885, R. C. M. 1935, in stating how a trust is created, do not lay
down in their requirements, the necessity of delivery of deed or
property to a trustee, it is not at all likely that delivery of deed
or property will be dispensed with when the trustor seeks to
make another than himself trustee of the trust.
*pL C. M. 1935, §7881. The term truator though not in general use
will be frequently used in this article to designate the settlor or creator
of the trust.
* R. C. M. 1935, §7884 and cases in annotations thereto.
"R.C. M. 1935, §6784 and cases in annotations thereto.
'R. C. M. 1935, §6883; O'Neil v. O'Neil (1911) 43 Mont. 505, 117 P.
889; Fender v. Foust (1928) 82 Mont. 73, 265 P. 15. A portion of the
gift, the trial court found, was given to be divided between three
others. The Court did not discuss whether this created a trust.
-R. C. M. 1935, §§6843-6848 and annotations thereto.
uSpringhorn v. Springer (1926) 75 Mont. 294, 243 P. 803; Hayes v.
Moffatt (1928) 83 Mont. 214, 271 P. 433; Carnahan v. Gupton (1939)
109 Mont. 244, 96 P. (2d) 513.
1 For a collection of cases see 1 ScoTt Oa TRUSTS (1939) §32.2, note 1.
'Dominy v. Stanley (1926) 162 Ga. 211, 133 S. E. 245; Wittmeier v.
Heiligenstein (1923) 308 Ill. 434, 139 N. E. 871; Bailey v. Kilburn
(1845) 10 Mete. (Mass.) 176. But see Rixford v. Zelgler (1907) 150
Cal. 435, 88 P. 1092.
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If the trustor is making himself trustee. he will naturally
make no delivery or other transfer of the property. The trust
will be complete on his declaration. It is unnecessary for the
trustor to part with the trust instrument."' The trustor must
create interests in the beneficiary while he is alive. Otherwise
the creation will be testamentary and to be valid must comply
with the Statute of Wills." If the trustor is making another,
trustee, he must not retain control of the legal title. He may
however, deliver the deed to a third party to deliver it on his
death to a trustee upon trust." While no Montana case has been
found dealing with the question in which a trust was involved,
there should be no doubt of the result in view of the court's de-
cision that a deed delivered to a third party to be turned over to
the grantee upon payment by him of funeral expenses of the
grantor was a valid inter vivos conveyance." Postponement of
enjoyment is not fatal."
Assuming that he complies with the foregoing requisites for
creating an inter vivos trust, may a trustor create a trust in
Montana of real or personal property for the benefit of himself
for life, remainder over to another, which will be valid though
the conveyance does not satisfy the statutory provisions regard-
ing wills ? It is well settled in other jurisdictions that he may.'
The Supreme Court of Montana has made no pronouncements.
It has, however, decided that an owner of real property may,
reserving a legal life estate in himself,' deed the remainder over
to another. Putting the life estate in trust followed by a legal
remainder should not make the conveyance testamentary. Sec-
tion 6787, R. C. M. 1935, restricts the purposes for which a trust
of real property may be created but expressly permits trusts to
pay the rents and profits for the life of a beneficiary, and neith-
er expressly nor by implication excludes an equitable interest
in the grantor. And in New York from which state the statu-
tory provision was taken, the settlor apparently may create such
an interest in himself, remainder over to another.'
There is no express provision in the codes to prevent the
"In re Brown's Will (1930) 252 N. Y. 366, 169 N. E. 612, 614; Morsman
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) 90 F. (2d)
18.1 Niccolls v. Niccolls (1914) 168 Cal. 444, 143 P. 712.
"Johnson v. Becker (1930) 251 Mich. 132, 231 N. W. 96.
"Plymale v. Keene (1926) 76 Mont. 403, 247 P. 554.
"Roberts v. Taylor (C. C. A. 9th, 1924) 300 F. 257, cert. denied 266
U. S. 629, 45 S. Ct. 195, 69 L. Ed. 477; Harrod v. McComas (1908)
78 Kans. 407, 96 P. 484.
"For a collection of cases see 1 Scowr ON TRUSTS (1939) §56.5, note 1.
"Bery v. Shelden (1935) 99 Mont. 321, 43 P. (2d) 239.
'Schenck v. Barnes (1898) 156 N. Y. 316, 50 N. E. 967.
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same trusts in personal property that are possible elswhere. In
New York the courts have held that statutory provisions, fore-
runners of the Field Code section from which Section 6787 was
taken, do not limit the purposes for which trusts in personal
property may be created.' California also held that statutory
provision" similar to Section 6787, did not apply to personal
property."
There would also seem, to be no difficulty in following the
provision for payment of the rents and profits to the settlor
for the life with a provision for the sale and disposal of the pro-
ceeds after the settlor's death. In California under that sec-
tion the Court upheld a deed of real estate to a trustee upon
trust to sell the property ten months after the testator's death
and divide the proceeds among certain beneficiaries." The ef-
fect of this was to leave a legal life estate in the trustor and to
create a future estate in fee in the trustee on trust to sell as is
specifically provided for under Section 6787 (1), R. C. M. 1935.
The trustor should be careful not to 'follow the provision
for thq life interest with a provision imposing upon the trustees
the duty to convey to the person or persons whom he desires to
enjoy the property upon his death. The Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia applying California Civil Code Sections 857 and 864,
identical with Sections 6787 and 6791, R.C.M. 1935, held in In re
Pair's Estate" that such a provision was void as an attempt to
create an active trust in land not permitted by Section 857 and
that the property would not go to the person to whom the trus-
tee was directed to convey, although under Section 864 of its
code as under Section 6791, R. C. M. 1935, "The author of the
trust may in its creation, prescribe to whom the real property
to which the trust relates shall belong, in the event of the failure
or termination of the trust."
If in the instrument creating a trust of real property the
settlor provides that reits and profits be paid to him for life
and upon termination of this trust the property should go to
his chosen beneficiary, the trust would clearly be within the pro-
visions of Sections 6787 and 6791 and the trust and the legal
remainder should be held valid.
"ERWIN N. GRIswoLw, SPENDTHRrIFT TR Ts (1936) §67 citing: Everitt
v. Everitt (1864) 29 N. Y. 39, 71; Gilman v. McArdle (1885) 99 N. Y.
451, 2 N. E. 464; Cochrane v. Schell (1894) 140 N. Y. 516, 534, 35
N. E. 971, 976.
"CA. CIv. COD 1857 (Repealed by STATS. 1929, p. 282).
wToland v. Toland (1898) 123 CaL 140, 55 P. 681.
"Nichols v. Emery (1895) 109 Cal. 323, 41 P. 1089.
"(1901) 132 Cal. 523, 64 P. 1000 (reversing opinion in department,
(1900) 132 Cal. 523, 60 P. 442.)
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However, unless the settlor should desire to have some one
manage the property for him there would seem to be no partic-
ular reason in establishing a trust. As in Berry v. Sheldene he
can accomplish the same purposes by conveying a legal remaind-
er in fee reserving a legal life estate for himself.
The trustor may want to go further and be able to enjoy
not only the life income but also reserve the right to cut into or
take all the principal for his own use and to change his mind
at any time during his life as to who will enjoy what is left of
the property on his death.
In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the
cases elsewhere are in substantial agreement, both with regard
to real and personal property, that a trust in which the trustor
reserves a life interest and power to revoke the trust at any time
during his life is not testamentary.'0 The trustor may also re-
serve the power to alter or amend the trust,' or the power to re-
call a part of the trust at any time,' or to change the benefici-
aries." The power to revoke "as an entirety this deed of trust"
has been held not to carry with it the power to revoke in part."
Although the power to revoke the whole would generally carry
with it the power to revoke a portion, it is perhaps wise to re-
serve a power to revoke in part.
The Court in Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings and Trust Co.'
distinguished between a reservation of a power to revoke in
whole or in part and a provision that the trustee shall on de-
mand "pay any . . .of the moneys.. . derived from the said
certificate of deposit" to the creator of the trust and held a
trust containing the latter provision testamentary. Although
it seems to be a case of a distinction without a difference and the
case was repudiated by the legislature of Wisconsin" and has
apparently not been followed elsewhere, nevertheless the trustor
will be wise to use the language of revocation.
There is one other warning. Although the language of
"See note 22 spra.
"The cases are collected in 1 SCOTT ON TRusTs (1939) § 57.1, note 1;
Nichols v. Emery (1895) 109 Cal. 23, 41 P. 1089; Allen v. Hendrick
(1922) 104 Ore. 202, 206 P. 733.
aJones v. Old Colony Trust Co. (1924) 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716;
Roche v. Brickley (1926) 254 Mass. 584, 150 N. E. 866; Allen v. Hen-
drick (1922) 104 Ore. 202, 206 P. 733.
'In Keck v. McKinstry (1928) 206 Iowa 1121, 221 N. W. 851 the creator
also reserved the right to appoint new trustees.
"Siter v. Hall (1927) 220 Ky. 43, 294 S. W. 767; Wilcox v. Hubbell
(1917) 197 Mich. 21, 163 N. W. 497.
"National Newark and Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl (1925) 97 N. J.
Eq. 74, 128 A. 586,
'(1924) 183 Wis. 156, 196 N. W. 829.
2WIso. STATUTES 1935, §231.205 (LAws OF Wis. 1931, c. 216).
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trust is used and the legal title is vested in purported trustees
if too much control over their actions has been reserved, the
Court may decide that they are simply agents to whom legal
title has been given and the disposition will fail as testamentary.
There are several cases so holding." One of these, McEvoy v.
Boston Five Cent Savings Bank," is much relied on by the
others. In the case the trustor reserving a power of revocation
transferred her savings bank deposits to trustees who were to
pay her as much of the money on deposit as she might demand
during her life, pay her funeral expenses and the balance to
designated beneficiaries. The case has caused and is likely to
cause further confusion. McGillivray v. First National Bank
of Dickinson," understood the case as putting limitations upon
the power of revocation. In Montana counsel for appellant
in Roecher v. Commercial National Bank," apparently relied
on the McEvoy case as so holding in his argument that reserva-
tions in a trust which permitted the settlor to take from the
principal fund or securities enough to maintain him and his
wife in their stations in life made the trust testamentary and
invalid. The Montana Court decided that counsel's conten-
tion was invalid, but did so on a ground which does not decide
the question in Montana.
In Massachusetts where the McEvoy case was decided, the
Supreme Court subsequently made it clear in Jones v. Old Col-
ony Trust Co.' that unlimited powers of revocation do not
make the trust testamentary. The Jones case also left the mat-
ter in doubt in Massachusetts as to what control could be re-
served over the trustees in their management of the trust prop-
erty and yet not make them simply agents and the trust testa-
mentary. According to this case, the test is not the same as
that used in determining whether a business organization is a
business trust or a joint stock company." Differing views pre-
vail in different jurisdictions. In Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins"
in which the court held the trust testamentary and that the
control reserved by the trustor made the trustee an agent, the
"McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank (1909) 201 Mass. 50, 87
N. E. 465; McGillivray v. First National Bank of Dickinson (1928)
56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 150; Union Trust Co. v. Hawkins (Ohio App.
1927) 161 N. E. 548; Warsco v. Oshkosh Savings and Trust Co. (1924)
183 Wis. 156, 196 N. W. 829. See also Darling v. Mattoon State Bank
(1926) 189 Wis. 117, 207 N. W. 254.
"(1909) 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 465.
ft(1928) 56 N. D. 152 217 N. W. 150.
'0(1930) 87 Mont. 570, 581, 289 P. 388, 391.
"(1924) 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716.
"At p. 309 of 251 Mass., p. 717 of 146 N. E.
"(Ohio App. 1927) 161 N. E. 548.
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trust instrument required that all investments be-submitted to
and approved by the settlor whose decision was to be final. See
comment on this case in a later Ohio case, Cleveland Trust Co.
v. White." In Keck v. McKinstry' in which the trustor re-
served the actual management of the property during his life
and the right to change trustees, the trustee's active duties be-
ginning on his death, the trust was held not to be testamentary.
In Kelly v. Parker' a trust was held not testamentary and void
in which the settlor deeded land to trustees with a provision
that the trustee permit the settlor to use, occupy, manage, con-
trol, improve, lease in any manner, and enjoy all the rents and
profits in the same manner as if he were the owner in fee. In
a number of other cases the retention by the settlor of consider-
able control over the trustee or almost unlimited control over
the trust property, has been held not to make the trust testa-
mentary.' The Restatement of the Law of Trusts in Section 57
(2) and comment thereon reflects the difficulty in drawing the
line. In view of the different results reached in the decisions, it
would appear unwise to attempt to reserve toQ much control over
the trustee or the trust property. However, a large measure of
control may be exercised by reason of the power of revocation.
If the trustee is not amenable to the trustor's suggestion the
latter may revoke and set up a new trust.
If the settlor chooses to make himself the trustee he may
perhaps retain more control over the investments. This is true
in Massachusetts where McEvoy v. Five Cent Savings Bank
was decided." Such a trust was held not testamentary in
Murray v. O'Hara" though there is a caution in the case that
the real intent of the settlor must not be testamentary. In
Irving Bank Columbia Trust Co. v. Rowe" a trust was held not
testamentary in which the settlor declared himself trustee of
securities for his son, reserved the power to revoke and kept the
income for himself. The son never learned of the trust until
after the death of the settlor who had apparently made, at
will, substitutions of securities, though keepint the principal
"(1938) 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N. E. (2d) 627. Right to revoke was reserved
on consent of trustees.
(1926) 206 Iowa 1121, 221 N. W. 851.
(1899) 181 Ill. 49, 54 N. E. 615.
"Bear v. Mlllkin Trust Co. (1929) 336 Ill. 366, 168 N. E. 349, 73 A.
L. R. 173; Goodrich v. City National Bank and Trust Co. (1935) 270
Mich. 222, 258 N. W. 253; Davis v. Rossi (1930) 326 Mo. 911, 34 S. W.
(2d) 8; Cleveland Trust Co. v. White (1938) 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.
E. (2d)- 627.
"(1909) 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. E. 465.
(1935) 291 Mass. 75, 195 N. E. 909.
**(1925) 213 App. Div. 281, 210 N. Y. S. 497.
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amount at the same value. In Sturgis v. Citizens' National
Bank of Pocomoke City et al." the settlor made a deposit in
the name of himself and another as trustees for the two sub-
ject to check by either, the balance to go to the survivor. No
signature card was ever procured from the beneficiary. The
trust was held nontestamentary and valid. In DeLeuil's Ez'rs
et al. v. DeLeuT" the trustor put securities in a box, informed
the bank he intended them to be in trust for his daughter, used
the income, and changed the securities from time to time. The
Court held that a valid inter vivos trust had been created. In
McGillivray v. Pirst National Bank," however, in which there
was slim evidence of an attempt to create a trust, the Court
relied on the fact that the trustor retained unqualified control
over the property in reaching its conclusion that no trust was
created. The Restatement of Trusts, Section 57(3), lays down
the following rule:
"Except as stated in §58, where the settlor declares
himself trustee and reserves not only a beneficial life es-
tate and a power to revoke and modify the trust but also
power to deal with the property as he likes as long as he
lives, the intended trust is testamentary."
See also the Comment to Subdivision 3.
The trustor must then proceed with caution for the Mon-
tana Court may find that he has stepped over the ill defined
lines suggested in this subdivision and some of the cases.
McEvoy v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank is a potential
source for further confusion. The Court in bolstering its opin-
ion said:
"But if it be thought that this view of the construction
and necessary legal effect of the instrument is too favorable
to the claimant, the exceptions must be overruled on the
ground that the evidence justified a finding by the trial
judge that the paper was intended as a mere testamentary
disposition of property, and not as a creation of a trust for
any other purpose, and that therefore there was no error of
law in the finding.' "
The Massachusetts court again in Roeche v. Brickley said:
"The judge has found that there was no violation of
the statute of wills. The fact that the plaintiff conveyed
only a small portion of her property by the trust agreement
"(1927) 152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378.
"(1934) 255 Ky. 406, 74 S. W. (2d) 474.
(1927) 56 N. D. 152, 163, 164, 217 N. W. 150, 153, 154.
U(1909) 201 Mass. 50,55, 87 N. E. 465, 466.
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does not of itself establish that the conveyance was not
testamentary and so not in violation of the statute of wills.
A conveyance may be bad because of such violation, al-
though it does not dispose of all one's property. But taken
in connection with other facts, especially that the gift takes
effect on the execution of the trust instrument, the fact that
a small part only of the donor's property is affected is per-
suasive that the instrument is not testamentary. The first
contention fails. "'
The policy of the Statute of Wills does not prevent a per-
son from deeding his property away at any time before his
death and so avoid the necessity of making a will. And it does
not seem at all likely that the Court which decided these cases
will hold testamentary a trust in which the avowed purpose of
the settlor is to avoid the expenses and delay incident to probate
or administration proceedings. There can hardly be any policy
of the law requiring an owner of property to submit to these
inconveniences. It is not clear what the Court means by vio-
lating the Statute of Wills. In the very ease of Roeche v.
Brickley" it was evident to the Court that the settlor was mak-
ing a trust as a substitute for a will and also that she was
doing it in order to accomplish a purpose which she couldn't
accomplish if she were to leave property by will-namely, place
"her property in such-a way that her husband would not share
in its distribution on her death". Incidentally such a use of
the trust in contrast with its use simply to avoid the expense
and delay of administration, might well be condemned as an
evasion," as being "on the wrong side of the line indicated by
the policy if not by the mere letter of the law" to use the lang-
uage of Mr. Justice Holmes." Additional cases" have upheld
revocable trusts in which the obvious purpose of the trustors
was to have the use of the property during their lives and to
deprive their spouses at the trustor's death of property of
which they could not be deprived by will. Although in at least
one other case" in which the trust was upheld there is the sug-
gestion that the trust might be bad if the settlor's intention was
"At. p. 588 of 254 Mass., p. 868 of 150 N. E.
"At p. 586 of'254 Mass., p. 868 of 150 N. E.
"1 ScOT ON TRuSTS (1939) §57.5. And see Newman v. Dore (1937)
275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 112 A. L. R. 643.
"lullen v. Wisconsin (1916) 240 U. S. 625, 36 S. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed. 830.
"Sturgis v. Citizens' National Bank of Pocomoke City (1927) 152 Md.
654, 137 A. 378; Windolph v. Girard Trust Co. (1914) 245 Pa. 349,
91 A. 634; Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co. (1932) 307 Pa.
570, 161 A. 721.
"Stone v. Hackett (1858) 12 Gray (Mass.) 227.
9
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to evade the Statute of Wills, no case has been found holding a
trust bad on those grounds despite the fact that to use the
words of the Illinois Court in Patterson v. McClenathan*" most
deeds of trust by which a trust is created to continue after the
death of the grantor are made to avoid the making of a further
disposition of the property." And there is additional authority
that a trust is not invalid because made in lieu of a will' and
to avoid administration after the settlor's death."
There is no direct Montana authority covering to any ex-
tent the problems that have just been discussed. There is no
reason to doubt that Montana will follow the general current
of authority representing as it does the current views of those
decisions as to what is the common law, which is the rule of
decision in Montana in the absence of constitutional or statu-
tory provisions to the contrary," or, unless out of harmony
with our democratic institutions, or inapplicable to our present
day conditions.' There is nothing in the law so laid down which
could be said to be inapplicable to present day conditions. There
are however some statutes to be considered.
At the outset two Montana statutes may be briefly noted.
Section 6790, R. C. M. 1935, provides:
"Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, every ex-
press trust in real property, valid as such in its creation,
vests the whole estate in the trustees, subject only to the ex-
ecution of the trust The beneficiaries take no estate or in-
terest in the property, but may enforce the performance of
the trust."
There is no indication in Montana that such a statute will
affect our problem. The cestui is recognized as having the
same equitable estate or interest which he would have in states
having no such statute" although the Court may in the decision
reiterate the language of the code."
Section 7921, R. C. M. 1935, provides that the trustor may
reserve the power to revoke which power he must strictly pursue.
There is no reason to believe that this power is limited to re-
-(1921) 296 11. 475, 482, 129 N. E. 767, 770.
"Bear v. Milliken Trust Co. (1929) 336 Ill. 366, 168 N. E. 349.
"Nichols v. Emery (1895) 109 Cal. 323, 41 P. 1089. This is the view
taken in the RESTATEMENT oF TRusTs §57 (1) comment d.
-R. C. M. 1935, §§5672, 10703.
"State ex rel. Metcalf v. District Court (1916) 52 Mont. 46, 49, 155 P.
278.
"Town of Cascade (1926) 75 Mont. 304, 243 P. 806; 90 Mont. 180, 300
P. 539.
OIn re Murphy's Estate (1935) 99 Mont. 114, 43 P. (2d) 233.
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yoking the whole of the trust. California under the same sec-
tion has frequently assumed the power to revoke in part.'
The statutory provisions in regard to trusts of land require
closer study. Section 6787, R. C. M. 1935, sets forth the pur-
poses for which an express trust in real property may be created
and Section 6783 provides that these are the only trusts which
can be created in Montana real property.
Under Subdivision 1 of Section 6787 the trustor may cre-
ate a trust "to sell real property, and apply or dispose of the
proceeds in accordance with the instrument creating the trust."
It should under this section be possible to devote the proceeds
to any purpose for which a trust in personal property could
be created" and the discussion concerning trust of personal
property would then apply. Subdivision 3, the other subdivi-
sion pertinent for our purposes, permits a trust in which the
trustee is to receive the rents and profits of real property, and
"to pay or apply them to the use of any person ... during the
life of such person . . . or for any shorter term."
While the trustor under this section could provide that the
rents and profits following the trustor's death should go to
other persons for life subject to the rules of Sections 6733 to
6759, R. C. M. 1935, at the end of such periods the trust must
terminate unless he directs the trustee to sell and dispose of
those proceeds in accord with subdivision 1, or makes pro-
vision under 2 and 4, which are perhaps unimportant for our
purposes. The trustor will under Section 6791 be able in the
instrument creating the trust to designate the persons to whom
the property shall go on the termination of the trust."
As to the trusts, Section 7921, R. C. M. 1935, permits the
power of revocation. May the trustor reserve the power to
revoke during his life the legal remainder in fee and to trans-
fer it to some one else? Section 67172 apparently renders this
"CAL. Civ. CoDE 1937, §2280. The California section was amended in
1931 (STATS. 1931, p. 1955).
"Hellman v. McWilliams (1886) 70 Cal. 449, 11 P. 659; Booth v. Oak-
land Bank of Savings (1898) 122 Cal. 19, 54 P. 370; In re Willey's
Estate (1900) 128 Cal. 1, 60 P. 471; Noble v. Learned (1908) 153 Cal.
245, 94 P. 1047.
"°See Nichols v. Emery (i895) 109 Cal. 323, 41 P. 1089. Deed of real
estate in trust to sell within ten months after trustor's death and
hold the proceeds on trust.
"See 8upra, p. 22.
nR. C. M. 1935, §6717. "A future interest may be defeated in any
manner or by any act or means which the party creating such interest
provided for or authorized in the creation thereof; nor is the future
interest, thus liable to be defeated, to be on that ground adjudged void
in its creation."
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possible. California has the same provision."8 In Tennant v.
John Tennant Memorial Home," the court relying on the pro-
vision held that a deed of real estate to the Home "excepting,
however, and reserving to said grantor the exclusive possession,
and the use and enjoyment in her own right, of the rents, issues
and profits of said lots . . . during the term of her natural life"
and reserving the power to revoke the deed as to the property,
or any portion of it, and further right to sell it, or any portion
of it, to another and keep the proceeds, was valid; that the
effect of the deed was to give the Memorial Home a future in-
terest; and that under the code section the power to revoke or
to sell was validly reserved and the original conveyances were
not invalid as testamentary. The same results are reached in
other jurisdictions not having statutory provisions, the courts
holding that the testator may deed a legal fee to others reserv-
ing a life interest in himself, and power to revoke 5 or to trans-
fer to others during his lifetime." Thus in Kokomo Trust Co.
v. Hiller' the testator had during his lifetime executed deeds
and delivered them to his lawyer with directions to record them
on his death. In the deeds it was recited "the grantor reserves
full possession and control of the property and the right to sell
and convey said real estate during his lifetime, but if at his
death he die seised ... then the conveyance shall be in full force
and effect." The court held that the deeds reserved life es-
tates in the grantor; vested fees in the grantees which were
defeasible on the exercise by the grantor of his reserved power
to sell or convey; and that the conveyances were not testa-
mentary.
Where the owner's desire is to reserve the utmost possible
control over his real property during his life as well as retain
the power during his life time to determine who shall enjoy
it after his death it apparently would be wise to follow the
method employed in the Tennant"5 case rather than risk the
possibilities of having the trust declared testamentary as in
McEvoy v. Boston Five Cent Savings Bank" on the grounds that
the trustee was only an agent. Section 6717, R. C. M. 1935, seems
to demand the result reached by the California Court and in view
"CA.. Civ. CODE 1937, §740.
"(1914) 167 Cal. 570, 140 P. 242.
'Jones v. Clifton (1879) 101 U. S. 225; Ricketts v. Louisville, St. Louis
& Texas P. Co. (1891) 91 Ky. 221, 15 S. W. 182, 11 L. R. A. 422, 34
Am. St. Rep. 176; Stamper v. Venable (1906) 117 Tenn. 557, 97 S. W.
812; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PwoPi'-r (3rd ed. 1939) §681.
"TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 75, §681 and notes 53 and 54 citing cases.
"(1917) 67 Ind. App. 611, 116 N. E. 332.
'(1914) 167 Cal. 570, 140 P. 242.
"(1909) 201 Mass. 50, 87 N. U. 465.
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of the fact that it accords with the prevailing law on the sub-
ject, there is no reason to suppose that our Court will reach a
result contrary to that of the Tennant case.* Unless, therefore,
the owner of land desires that another have the responsibility
of it as trustee during his life, there would seem to be no par-
ticular advantage in the trust device over deeding a legal fee,
reserving a legal life estate and the power to revoke the fee or
any part thereof or convey to others. Either device, however,
should be held to be valid.
Suppose, however, the owner of real property in Montana
declares himself a trustee to pay the rents and profits to him-
self for life, and, carefully avoiding putting upon himself the
duty to convey the fee, in the same instrument provides that
the legal remainder in fee should go to others reserving how-
ever the power to revoke in whole or in part or to convey to
others. Where the same individual has the entire legal, as well
as the entire beneficial interest, there is no trust.' Since the
same person has all the legal and equitable interest that was
attempted to be put in trust, the Court would in all probability
take the view that the owner had simply a legal life estate with
legal remainder over. The result would then not be different
from that reached in the Tennant case. When it comes to per-
sonal property, however, the trust device may be more im-
portant. In the first place, as has been previously stated,'
the limitations put by Section 6787 upon trusts do not apply
to personal property. In the second place, there may perhaps
be more need for the trust since the law is unsettled as to
future legal interests in personal property. In the majority
jurisdictions it is clear that an interest analagous to a remainder
after a life estate may be created" but whether when the attempt
is to give A a life interest, remainder to B, A has a right only
to possession, the immediate Vested right of property being in
B, or A has the legal right of property which on his death
shifts to B, or A holds the whole interest in the chattel in
trust is not clear." Our statutes do not clarify the situation.
Section 6698, R. C. M. 1935, provides-
" . C. M. 1935, §6845 providing that a grant can't be delivered to a
grantee conditionally should have no more effect than the same pro-
visions in §1056 CAL Civ. CODE had in the Tennant case. That statute
simply embodies the common law rule in regard to delivery of deeds.
See 1 WiIT sTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) §212.
"1 ScoTT ON TRUSTS (1939) §99, and cases cited in note 1 thereto.
"See supra, pp. 21, 22.
"Simes, Puture Interests In Chattets Personal, 39 YAi L. J. 771, 784,
note 36 (1930) citing cases.
"GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3rd ed. 1915) §69.
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"The names and classification of interests in real prop-
erty have only such application to interests in personal
property as is in this division of the code expressly pro-
vided."
There appears to be no such specific provisions in the divi-
sion of the Code.
There is the further question whether a revocable future
legal interest of personal property could be given.' In view of
the very great uncertainty as to the subject of future interests
in personal property "it may almost be said to be a slip in
draftsmanship to create future interests in chattels personal
without the intervention of the trust" as one writer puts it."
Although there is no direct Montana authority in point there
is no reason to suppose that the court would refuse to follow
current authority" which upholds as nontestamentary a con-
veyance to trustees upon trust for the trustor for life, remainder
to others with power of revocation reserved. As in the case of
realty the trustor should be careful not to reserve too great a
control over the trustee or the trust property for fear that the
court may as in the McEvoy case treat the trustee as an agent
and the conveyance as testamentary."
If the trustor makes himself sole trustee upon trust to
pay the income to himself for life and subject there-to in trust
for others on his death, he may have more control over the in-
vestments. Our Court might possibly take the view, criticized
by Professor Scott,' of the New York Court based, however,
on a statute not found in Montana, and treat the legal and
equitable estate as merging in a legal life estate in the trustor
with the remainder in fee in others. As pointed out by Pro-
fessor Scott in most of the cases the rights which the parties
would have had in the trust as cestuis had the conveyance
been treated as making a trust, including the power to cut in
or take the whole of the principal, were fully protected. How-
'§6884 in the chapter on transfer of personal property provides that
"A gift, other than a gift in view of death, cannot be revoked by the
giver."
uSimes, op. ct. supra, note 83, p. 779.
"In addition to authorities previously cited see particularly the Cali-
fornia cases, where code provisions are similar to ours, cited in note
69, supra.
08upaM. pp. 23, 24.
"1 ScoTT ON TRUsTs (1939) §99.3. See particularly Woodward v. James
(1889) 115 N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 150; Rose v. Hatch (1891) 125 N. Y.
427, 26 N. E. 467 (right to use so much of the corpus as was necessary
for the support and maintenance of the life tenant) ; Weeks v. Frankel
(1910) 197 N. Y. 304, 90 N. E. 969 (power of sale) ; Major v. Major
(1917) 177 App. Div. 102, 163 N. Y. S. 925.
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ever, in Matter of Richardson," discussed by Mr. Scott, the life
tenant was required to give bond. In the situation we are con-
sidering the Court would have no reason for requiring bond
even if it treated the transaction as giving the creator a legal
life interest with remainder over since he has full power to
revoke. If the New York view were taken, the result as to
personalty would be about the same as that reached in regard
to realty in the Tennant case."
One particular class of case deserves especial notice. In
Matter of Totten" the Court, in a case involving a deposit in a
savings account, laid down what is known as the "tentative
trust" doctrine in the following language:
"A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own
name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not es-
tablish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the de-
positor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until
the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by
some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the
pass book or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor
dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or some de-
cisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption
arises that an absolute trust was created as to the balance
on hand at the death of the depositor."
It was regarded at the time as a radical innovation and ju-
dicial legislation by at least one writer" who thought it, how-
ever, constructive legislation though difficult to justify as an
exercise of judicial power.
It will be noted that the deposit is treated as creating a
revocable trust though the depositor has not expressly reserved
the power of revocation and the beneficiary receives the bal-
ance on the depositor's death although the latter has reserved
absolute control of the property during his lifetime. Evidence
is of course admissible to show that he intended to create an
irrevocable trust or that he intended no trust at all. The Amer-
ican Law Institute has accepted the doctrine." Under its Re-
statement of the Law of Trusts death of the beneficiary prior
to the trustor will revoke the trust and the trustor may revoke
it in his will. The convenience of the device is obvious which
" (1929) 135 Misc. 726, 238 N. Y. S. 271; aff'd. mem. (1930) 229 App.
Div. 765, 243 N. Y. S. 845.
"(1914) 167 Cal 570, 140 P. 242.
(1904) 179 N. Y. 112, 125, 71 N. E. 748, 752.
"Larremore, Judicial Legslation, 14 YALE L. J. 312, 315 (1905).
"REsTATEmNET OF THE LAW OF TRusTs, £58.
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probably accounts for its adoption in some other states." There
have been no Montana decisions on the question. Section 6014.54,
R. C. M. 1935, reads:
"Whenever any deposit shall be made in any bank by
any person in trust for another, and no other or further
notice of the existence and terms of a legal and valid trust
shall have been given in writing to the bank, in the event
of the death of the trustee, the same, or any part thereof, to-
gether with the interest or dividends thereon, may be paid
to the person for whom said deposit was made."
An almost identical statutory provision in Jefferson Trust
Co. v. Hoboken Trust Co.," and similar provisions in Alger v.
North End Savings Bank" and Thatcher v. Trenton Trust Co."
were said by the courts to be designed simply to protect the
banks in case of payment to the beneficiary. The courts in.
these two states take a view contrary to Matter of Totten and
permit the personal representative of the depositor to prevail
over the beneficiary.
In view of the present state of authority the depositor in
Montana by making a deposit such as that made in Matter of
Totten could not with certainty count on having the named
beneficiary receive what was left in a savings account. Un-
doubtedly the position taken by the Restatement will help to
establish the doctrine in states which have not already taken a
contrary view. At least two cases" which followed Matter of
Totten have cited Section 58.
There is a closely related method of using the trust which
should succeed in jurisdictions following Matter of Totten and
has succeeded in others prior to the decision in the Totten case.
In Milholland v. Whalen' the settlor deposited money in her
own name "in trust for herself and Mary Whalen, widow, joint
owners subject to the order of either; the balance at the death
of either to belong to the survivor." The depositor retained
the bank book and never notified Mary Whalen of the deposit.
"The New York cases following in Matter of Totten are collected in
1 ScoTr ON TRusTS (1939) §58.3, note 4, those from other jurisdic-
tidns in note 5, and in note 6 those that hold that the beneficiary is
not entitled on the death of the depositor. The "tentative trust" is
exhaustively treated 1 Sco-r ON TRUSTS (1939) §§58 to 58.6.
"(1930) 107 N. J. Eq. 310, 152 A. 374.
" (1888) 146 Mass. 418, 15 N. E. 916.
"(1936) 119 N. J. Eq.* 408, 182 A. 912.
"Bollack v. Bollack (Md. 1936) 182 A. 317 (in which it was clear from
the form of deposits that the beneficiary was to have what was left on
depositor's death) ; In re Pozzuto's Estate (1936) 124 Pa. Super. 93,
188 A. 309.
'"(1899) 89 Md. 212, 43 A. 43.
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Mary Whalen was held entitled on the death of the depositor
to what remained of the deposit. T)he importance of depositing
upon trust is shown by a companion case, Whalen v. Milhol-
land.' The deposit being made: "Elizabeth O'Niel and Mary
Whalen. Payable to the order of either or to the survivor."
The Court held that a delivery of the savings bank book was
necessary to complete the gift and therefore Mary failed in
the action.
However, in Booth v. Oakland Bank' the depositor ex-
pressed a desire to the teller to add the names of two sisters
to her savings account so that in the event of her death they
could draw out the money without probate proceedings. She
then furnished the signatures of her sisters and the bank added
their names to the pass book. She then notified the sisters that
on her death they could collect what was left on deposit and
divide equally between them. She retained the passbook. The
California Supreme Court held that there was an incomplete
gift but that there was enough evidence to justify the court
below in finding a trust in favor of the sisters; that the fact
that she reserved power to withdraw so much as she saw proper
during her lifetime did not affect the validity of the trust and
therefore the court erred in nonsuiting the sisters.
In Noble v. Learned' the California Supreme Court in
refusing, in line with current authority," to turn an imperfect
gift in to a trust, on having the Booth case pressed upon it,
called attention to the fact that that case involved a non-suit
and that therefore if there was any evidence of a trust the
nonsuit would be improperly granted. In a subsequent Cali-
fornia case, however, an imperfect gift was sustained as a trust.'"
The trust is frequently used in place of a will and with
success in order to avoid some statutory provisions which in-
hibit the will making power. As has been noted it has been
successfully used to deprive a spouse of property which he or she
could not be deprived by will even in those jurisdictions which
suggest the possibility that the trust would be bad if used to
violate the Statute of Wills." Many other cases are to be found
including both those where the trust is irrevocable' and re-
vokable.'
10(1899) 89 Md. 199, 43 A. 45.
1'(1898) 122 Cal. 19, 54 P. 370.
10(1908) 153 Cal. 245, 94 P. 1047.
'1 ScoTT ON TRUSTS (1939) §31, note 1.
'"American Bible Soc. v. Mortgage Guarantee Co. (1932) 217 Cal. 95,
17 P. (2d) 105.
'S~upra, pp. 26-28.
'1 SCOTT ON TRUSTS (1939) §57.5, note 1.
'"Cases Collected in 1 ScoTT ON TRUSTS (1939) §57.5, note 2.
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Judging from the weight of authority the chances are very
good that a married woman may in Montana by the revocable
trust device secure to herself the enjoyment of her property
during her life and to others than her husband the enjoyment
of all of it upon her death despite the fact that Section 6975,
R. C. M. 1935, prevents her from depriving him of more than
two-thirds of it by will. But this is not entirely free from
doubt. In the recent case of Neumnan v. Doretm the Court of
Appeals in New York in a case in which the settlor reserved the
power to control the trustees as well as the enjoyment of the
property during his life and the power of revocation, and gave
all the beneficial interest in fee to others than his wife, the
Court assuming, without deciding, that for other purposes the
trust would not be testamentary and invalid, held that with
reference to the New York statutory provisions limiting the
rights to deprive the spouse of property by will the trust was
illusory and not effective to deprive the settlor's widow of her
rights.
The trust would seem to be an equally good device for
evading Section 7015, R. C. M. 1935, making invalid devises or
bequests of more than one-third the testator's property by a
will executed within thirty days of his death. A device fre-
quently used is to leave the property to a person or persons
absolutely and then take steps to see that some one shall notify
the legatees or devisees after the testator's death of his desires.
The scheme is dangerous because the devisee or legatee may if
he desires keep the property for himself.' On the other hand
a trust inter vivos carefully framed for the purpose would not
entail the risk and would stand a very good chance of evading
Section 7015.
In summary, the owner of property in Montana should be
able to count with reasonable certainty on the fact that by a
trust carefully created during his lifetime, he may have the
beneficial use of his property as long as he lives and retain till
death the power to determine who shall succeed him in the en-
joyment of it. He may thus avoid the expense and delay of
administration of an estate.
If he desires, however, to control the management of his
*(1937) 275 N. Y. 271, 9 N. E. (2d) 966. See notes on the case in 37
CoLum. L. Rav. 1219 (1937); 23 CORNaLL L. Q. 457 (1938); and dis-
cussion in 1 Scoorr ON TausTrs (1939) §57.5.
'Schultz Appeal (1876) 80 Pa. 396; Flood v. Ryan (1908) 220 Pa. 450,
69 A. 908; In re Bickley's Estate (1921) 270 Pa. 101, 113 A. 68; See
also O'Donnell v. Murphy (1912) 17 Cal. App. 625, 120 P. 1076. For a
general discussion see Leaphart, The Use, As Distinct From The Trust,
A Factor in the Law Today, 79 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 253 (1931).
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real property during his life, it would seem safer to deed the
property to his intended beneficiaries reserving a legal life es-
tate for himself with power to revoke and to convey the fee to
others. If he desires to vest the management of his real prop-
erty in others he may convey to trustees upon trust to pay the
rents and profits to himself for life and provide that upon his
death the legal remainder shall go over to others reserving dur-
ing his life the power of revocation and of transfer to others.
As to personal property, the trust seems the wiser device,
and whether an owner makes himself or another the trustee, he
should not retain the power to deal with the property as though
the conveyance had never been made for fear that the transac-
tions will be held to be testamentary. Just where the line will
be drawn i not clear. If, however, an owner of money makes
a deposit of it in a savings bank in his own name in trust for
another the chances are that he may deal with the deposit as
he pleases during his life, and on his death the balance left in
the account will go to the intended beneficiary. It is also prob-
able that Sections 6975 and 7015, R. C. M. 1935 may be evaded
by use of the trust device.
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